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COMMENT
TRUSTS - TOTTEN TRUSTS IN COLORADO - Estate of Hall v. Father
Flanagan's Boys' Home, 491 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
N Estate of Hall v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home," Colorado
joined the growing list of jurisdictions which recognizes the
validity of revocable or tentative savings account trusts, com-
monly known as "Totten" trusts.2 Such trusts have two im-
portant attributes. First, the settlor retains an unlimited power
of control over the subject matter.3 Second, it represents an
effective form of testamentary disposition for which compliance
with the Statute of Wills is not necessary. As a result of these
benefits, a majority of the states presently concede the enforce-
ability of either private4 or charitable5 Totten trusts.
Totten trusts were first upheld in the case of In re Totten,6
wherein the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a person
who deposits a sum in his own name in trust for another can
intend to create: (1) an irrevocable trust, (2) no trust at all,
or (3) a revocable trust. The court then established a set of
rules which still govern revocable Totten trusts:
A deposit by one person of his own money in his own name
as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an
irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a
tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies
or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act
or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to
the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the bene-
ficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration
of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust
was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor.
7
In the instant case the Colorado Court of Appeals chose
an unusual fact situation in which to validate Totten trusts
in Colorado. Mrs. Hall, the creator of the trust, opened a savings
account in 1965 naming herself as the trustee and Father Flana-
gan's Boys' Home as the beneficiary.' The signature card bore
1 491 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
2 See generally 3 P-H 1967 EsT. PLAN. T 3604 et seq.
3 1 A. ScoTr, LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.6 (3d ed. 1967).
4 Id. § 58.
5 Id. § 361.
6 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
7 Id. at 125-26, 71 N.E. at 752.
8 One of appellant's contentions rejected by the court of appeals was
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
appellee where the "Discretionary Revocable Trust Agreement" stated
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the printed caption "Discretionary Revocable Trust Agreement"
and set forth the terms of the trust agreement on the reverse
side. Following Mrs. Hall's death, her executor filed a petition
in district court to have the trust declared invalid. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Father Flanagan's
Boys' Home, and Mrs. Hall's executor appealed.
In its decision, the court of appeals relied directly on the
Totten trust theory. It seems possible, as urged by the appellee,
that the trust in Estate of Hall could have been upheld as a
valid inter vivos trust without resorting to the Totten theory. 9
Nevertheless, when the appellants challenged the validity of the
trust on the grounds that the creator had too much control over
the corpus, the court responded by stating: "Although we find
no Colorado cases directly on point, the great weight of modern
authority has upheld the validity of savings account trusts
(often referred to as 'Totten Trusts') as against these objec-
tions."'10 There can, therefore, be no question as to the court's
acceptance of the Totten trust theory as the basis for its
decision.
the account was in trust for "Boys Town (A Nebraska Non-profit
Organization) ," the bankbook bore the legend "Boys Town of
Nebraska," and it was agreed that no entity existed in Nebraska under
either of these names. Three other Nebraska organizations with the
words "Boys Town" appearing in their names disclaimed in favor of
appellee, and the court held no issue of material fact was raised by
the pleadings, affidavits, and admissions. 491 P.2d at 616-17.
9Both parties agreed it was unnecessary for the court to rule on the
validity of a Totten trust in Colorado in the case. Appellant urged
reversal on the grounds that the attempt to create the trust failed.
Appellee urged the ruling of the district court be affirmed on the
grounds that a valid discretionary, revocable trust had been created.
Brief for Appellant at 25-26, Brief for Appellee at 8, Estate of Hall v.
Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 491 P.2d 614 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971). A
second rationale upon which the trust could possibly have been up-
held was not argued. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122-3-15(2) (1963)
provides:
Every [savings and loan] association shall have power to issue
stock or shares to any person on a revocable trust for another
person, who is either named in writing as beneficiary thereof
or who is unnamed. At any time during the lifetime of the
trustee, the stock or shares together with dividends, if any,
shall be withdrawn only by the trustee. On the death of the
trustee . . . the stock or shares together with dividends, if
any, shall be paid to the person for whom the stock or shares
were issued as designated beneficiary even though he or she
not be of full legal capacity ....
Whether or not one who deposits money in an account has "stock or
shares" in the association within the meaning of the words of the
statute is not certain, but at least one decision has held that a person
who deposited money in a savings and loan association, and was
issued certificates of deposit in return, was a shareholder in the asso-
ciation and not entitled to the priority of a creditor over other mem-
bers of the association, even though no actual shares were issued.
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Receivers of the City Say., Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 95 Colo. 498, 37 P.2d 394 (1934).
10491 P.2d at 616.
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This type of trust is of special significance because it per-
mits unlimited control to be retained by the depositor.1 The
Colorado Supreme Court confronted the issue of control in
Denver National Bank v. Von Brecht 2 and held that "a settlor
may reserve a life income for himself, together with the right
to revoke the trust, and he may reserve additional powers if he
does not go too far."'13 Although a limit to this control has yet
to be precisely defined, it is now accurate to say that the
degree of control allowed by a Totten trust does not exceed the
Von Brecht definition.
Of equal significance is the fact that the Totten trust per-
mits the inter vivos distribution of property outside of one's
estate.14 This planning device is not violative of public policy
since the supreme court held in Von Brecht that:
[I]f an owner of property can dispose of it inter vivos and
thereby render a will unnecessary for accomplishment of his
practical purposes, he has a right to do so. The motive in mak-
ing such a transfer may be to obtain the practical advantages
of a will without the necessity of making one, but the motive
is immaterial.15
The decision in Estate of Hall is, therefore, significant for
two reasons. First, Colorado has joined the majority of juris-
dictions in upholding the validity of Totten trusts. Second, al-
though the subject of the trust was a savings account, it appears
that the court of appeals has gone one step further than the
supreme court did in Von Brecht16 by permitting the settlor to
retain even more control over the corpus.
17
Rodney D. Knutson
11 Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a bank or other
savings organization in his own name as trustee for another person
intending to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of
the deposit at any time during his lifetime and to use as his own
whatever he may withdraw, or otherwise revoke the trust, the in-
tended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the
depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his death if he has
not revoked the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
12 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
13 Id. at 102, 322 P.2d at 674 (emphasis added). However, where the
motive for creating the trust or the effect of its creation is to impair
or defeat the spouse's right to elect against the will, the outcome of
an attack on the validity of any revocable, inter vivos trust in Colorado
in uncertain. See Huff, An Aspect of Estate Planning in Colorado: The
Revocable Inter Vivos Trust, 43 DENVER L.J. 296 (1966).
14 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 58.3.
15 137 COLO. 88, 99, 322 P.2d 667, 672.
16 Id. at 88, 322 P.2d at 667.
17 For a general history of revocable trusts in Colorado see Huff, supra
note 13. The Colorado position concerning retention of control is
treated at pages 305-09.
1972
